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Introduction
The private security industry is growing rapidly across
the globe and governments are implementing numerous
strategies to attempt to control it. Scholars tend to agree
that drafting and imposing comprehensive regulations is
one of the most effective strategies states can use to con
trol and direct private security companies to reduce inse
curity and operate effectively, safely, and accountably.
A number of studies on private security tend to highlight –
and rightfully so – the weaknesses or absence of states’
private security regulations (Argueta, 2012; Born; Buzatu,
2008; Lopes, 2018; McCrie, 2017; Nagaraj, 2012; Simelane,
2008). However, strengthening a regulatory regime is not
sufficient for solving many problems plaguing the private
security industry and can even be counterproductive if
state institutions are weak.
In this essay, I explore how attempts to strictly regulate
private security firms at the federal and state level have fai
led to rein in the industry in Mexico. The Federal gover
nment of Mexico, Mexico City, and every state have deve
loped some form of regulation to control the activities of
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the private security industry. Although varied from state to
state, these regulations are quite comprehensive, detailed,
and stringent in states with the largest number of private
security providers. In this study, I argue that these strict
laws have limited the State’s ability to effectively impose
control over the industry. First, the complicated, expensive,
and time-consuming registration process and require
ments to remain in good standing are too high a barrier to
entry for potential firms. Second, government officials and
bureaucrats may use their power as gatekeepers to extract
bribes and restrict access to private security and weapons
licenses to friends and associates. Third, weak enforcement
of private security regulations due to corruption and a lack
of political will disincentivizes companies from abiding by
the law. These factors led to a widespread regulation evasion,
which has in turn created an expansive market of unregu
lated and undisciplined private security companies that fur
ther contribute to disorder and insecurity.
I base my findings on a qualitative research design
focused on three subnational cases, – Mexico City, Jalisco,
and Nuevo León. I analyze the regulations of each state
and their consequences based on data collected from
government documents, archival materials, and interviews
with representatives from Mexico’s security field.
To assess the attempts of the Mexican government to
regulate the private security industry, this essay will discuss
the literature on private security regulations, examine com
peting theories on regulations and show how the Mexican
case aligns more closely with the public choice theory as
opposed to the public interest theory. After presenting
a brief history of private security regulations in Mexico,
I apply a model to assess their quality and scope. Finally,
I describe how and why these regulatory efforts have failed
to successfully rein in the industry, reinforcing the weakness
of Mexican state institutions.
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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The literature on private security regulations tends to
be centered on the Global North, providing rich insights
about the political process and motives behind the crea
tion of or resistance to regulations (Bure 2015; Smith;
White 2014; White, 2010; Zedner 2006), the type and qua
lity of regulations in individual countries (Button, 2011;
Hemmens et al., 2001; McCrie, 2017; Nalla; Crichlow,
2017) and comparatively across countries (Button, 2012;
Button; Stiernstedt, 2017; Button; Stiernstedt, 2018;
Leloup; White, 2021; Prenzler; Sarre, 2008; White, 2014;
Scheerlinck et al., 2020a; Scheerlinck et al., 2020b;
Waard, 1999), as well as the best practices and regulatory
frameworks for the industry (Button et al., 2019; Button;
George, 2006; Prenzler; Sarre, 2008).
When compared with many areas of the Global South,
the Global North tends to possess higher state capacity and
lower corruption, crime, and violence levels. Therefore,
states in the Global South face different and greater challen
ges when confronting the private security industry. Likewise,
the issue of regulation takes on higher stakes as private security
providers have greater potential to significantly exacerbate
inequality and insecurity. In Latin America, for example,
the murder rate is higher than in any other region in the
world; police forces are often widely disrespected for poor
effectiveness and abusive and corrupt behavior; and gover
nment bureaucracies, often rife with corruption, struggle to
serve the citizenry. Nevertheless, the literature on pri
vate security regulations in the Global South, and espe
cially Latin America, lags behind that in the Global North,
thus demanding greater attention. the recently published edi
ted volume Regulating the Security Industry: Global Perspectives
(Nalla; Prenzler, 2018), which does an excellent job com
piling research on regulatory regimes in the United States,
Western and Eastern Europe, Oceania, East Asia, and Africa,
while completely disregarding Latin America.
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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While the literature on private security in Latin America
is slowly growing, few studies focus directly on regulations
(some exceptions include Lopes; Moraes, 2018 and Perret,
2013). Much of the literature on private security in Latin
America describes the emergence of the industry and its
current make-up in either a single country (Argueta 2013;
Huggins, 2000; Muller, 2010; Solar, 2019; Wood; Cardia 2006)
or multiple countries in the region (Ungar, 2007-2008).
Although critically valuable for understanding how and why
the industry has grown in Latin America and its various mani
festations across the region, most of these texts include a
relatively brief discussion of regulations that tend to rightly
emphasize rampant informality within the industry. Generally,
these texts either highlight a country’s lack of sufficient pri
vate security regulations (see Argueta, 2013; Solar, 2019) or
weak state enforcement of regulations (Muller, 2010; Perret,
2013) or else the link is mentioned but not deeply explored
(Huggins, 2000; Wood; Cardia, 2006).
Reports on private security in Latin America provide
useful insights on the state of regulations and the challenges
faced by many countries in the region; however, they tend
to lack theoretical development (see DCAF, 2016; Kinosian;
Bosworth, 2018; Robert Strauss Center, 2018). While coun
tries such as Chile and Guatemala possess outdated and insuf
ficient regulatory regimes, other countries in the region such
as Mexico and Brazil possess relatively strict private security
laws, but also high levels of informality. Focusing on the case
of Mexico and relying on the tollbooth variant of the public
choice theory, this study analyzes the link between strict regu
lations and weak enforcement – which has created a chaotic
security market where informality reigns.

Theories of regulation and private security
One of the primary debates within the literature on
regulations contemplates governments’ motivations and
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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consequences, which splits many scholars into two dia
metrically opposed camps: public interest theorists and
public choice theorists. Formulated by English economist
Arthur Cecil Pigou, the public interest theory posits that
regulations are imposed by able and benevolent govern
ments to serve the public interest by remedying market
failures, particularly monopolistic behavior, and nega
tive externalities. Pigou explains that “in any industry,
where there is reason to believe that free play of self-in
terest will cause an amount of resources to be invested
different from an amount that is required in the best inte
rest of the national dividend, there is a prima facie case for
public intervention” (1938, p. 331). Government regula
tions are assumed to be costless and, therefore, the most
logical and effective mechanism for creating a more equi
table and efficient market. Examples of poor regulatory
performance are written off as cases of bad management
that can be remedied with more experience (Posner,
1974; Shleifer 2005; Stigler, 1970). Scholars of private
security tend to align with the public interest theory by
arguing that imposing and enforcing regulations is the
most effective tool for controlling burgeoning private
security industries within a state’s borders and promoting
“optimal security” (Button, 2012, p. 204). Despite some
exceptions (Argueta, 2012; Muller, 2010), most studies on
the field fail to consider the downside to imposing more
regulations on the industry, thus exhibiting an implicit
bias towards the public interest theory.
On the other hand, the public choice theory “sees the
government as less benign and regulation as socially inef
ficient” (Djankov et al, 2002, p. 2). Inspired by Mancur
Olson’s (1965) logic of collective action, this theory
argues that regulations solely benefit the interests of spe
cific groups (Farber and Frickey, 1991; Hantke-Domas,
2003). Although generally credited to George Stigler
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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(1971; 1974), Posner (1974) and Peltzman (1976) were
other important early contributors to the theory. The ori
ginal variant is Stigler’s “capture theory” – which argues
that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”
(Stigler, 1971, p. 1). More specifically, economic enti
ties manipulate the political system to obtain regulations
designed for their own benefit and often to the detriment
of the public interest.
Industries have lower collective action costs because
they tend to have homogenized interests and a greater
stake in the regulatory process than a diffuse public with
varying interests, less access to information, and a lower
overt stake in the issue. They are better equipped to
influence political representatives to pass legislation that is
favorable to their interests and alter regulations that have
already passed (Etzioni, 2009; Posner 1974). For example,
industries may dilute, repeal, and weaken enforcement of
existing regulations and/or manipulate and switch regula
tors (Etzioni, 2009).
A new variant of the public choice theory emerged
in the late 1980s and 1990s, shifting the focus from the
interests of industries to those of state actors. Dubbed by
Djankov et. al. as the “tollbooth view,” this approach
initially developed by McChesney (1987) and De Soto
(1989) “holds that regulation is pursued for the benefit
of politicians and bureaucrats” (Djankov et al, 2002, p. 3).
According to this view, politicians and bureaucrats develop
and enforce regulations s to wield power over those see
king access to the industry being regulated, thus profiting
off the industry by demanding bribes to access to the sector
in question. Such a view also poses that “more extensive
regulation should be associated with socially inferior
outcomes, particularly corruption” (p. 3).
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Djankov et al. (2002) conducted a study on entry regu
lations with 85 countries,1 verifying that countries with more
regulations tend to be more corrupt and possess much larger
informal economies. According to their findings, strict and
copious entry regulations in these situations rarely succeed at
fulfilling the intended positive social outcomes. Glaeser and
Shliefer (2003) explain that “countries with more regulations
of entry exhibit higher corruption and larger unofficial eco
nomies, but not superior social outcomes that regulation alle
gedly aims for” (p. 420).
The public choice theory functions as a guide for the
Mexican case. Stringent Mexican regulations and the high
costs to abide by them has allowed politicians and bureau
crats in the federal and state governments to use the tol
lbooth approach by rewarding associates with expedited
private security licenses, reduced costs, and limited super
vision. Simultaneously, these actors create high barriers for
non-connected firms by demanding expensive fees, bribes,
and/or delaying registration process. In an environment
of widespread informality and corruption, Mexican pri
vate security owners have been disincentivized to properly
register their firms and abide by state and federal regula
tions. However, before delving into the problems, I will first
recount the history of regulatory regimes in Mexico and
their current make-up.

Private security regulations in Mexico
In 1948, the Federal government of Mexico passed
its first private security legislation, the Reglamento para los
Investigadores, Detectives y Policías Privados o pertenecientes a
Organismos de Servicio Público Descentralizado o Concesionado
(Regulations for Investigators, Detectives and Private Police
Entry regulations refers to legal requirements imposed upon businesses attempting
to enter an industry.
1

Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021

35

A failure to impose control

36

or those Belonging to Decentralized or Licensed Public
Service Agencies). Primarily applied to private detectives
and private policing units tasked with guarding public insti
tutions, the regulations were relatively rudimentary and lac
ked width and depth – despite including some registration,
hiring, and uniform requirements.
In 1985, President Miguel de la Madrid repealed and
decreed this legislation unconstitutional for violating
Article 21, which states that public policing is the exclu
sive right of the Mexican state and, therefore, cannot be
delegated or licensed to private individuals (México, 1985;
Universal, 1984a). Despite the decree, private security
companies were only barred from performing police func
tions and using the term policía in their documentation,
identification, or company name. Firms complying with
these rules were permitted to continue operating (México,
1985). As the abrogated 1948 legislation was not replaced
by a new federal private security law until 2006, states had
to formulate their own private security regulations.
Due to the massive growth of the private security indus
try during in the 1990s, the Federal District and Mexican sta
tes began formulating their own private security regulations.
The growth in private security provision in Mexico peaked in
1999, showing a 40% increase compared to the year before
(Muller, 2010). By 2000, over 1,400 private security companies
were registered with the federal government and many more
operated informally. Be it specific private security codes or
regulations within public security laws, today, every Mexican
state has some type of private security regulation. In the fol
lowing section, I classify regulatory regimes using a modified
version of the model proposed by Button and George to show
how private security law and regulations of the Federal gover
nment and of states with cities with the highest number of
private security companies – Mexico City, Guadalajara, Jalisco,
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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and Monterrey Nuevo León – are quite comprehensive and
generally wide in scope.

Assessing Private Security Regulations in Mexico
Currently, we still lack internationally agreed upon stan
dards for private security regulatory frameworks. In 2008,
“The Montreux Document” outlined a set of good practi
ces and standards for the private security industry, focusing
on the practices of private military and security companies
in armed conflict zones. The document was ratified by 54
states, including four from Latin America, but not Mexico,
for its scope was not entirely applicable to private security
companies operating in non-military contexts. Despite the
lack of an international agreement for private security com
panies engaged in non-military-related activities, scholars,
practitioners, and international governmental organizations
have endeavored to develop standards and best practices
applicable specifically to this sector. To assess the regula
tions in Mexico, I rely on a rubric developed by Button and
George (2006) for analyzing the quality and depth of sta
tutory private security regulations, incorporating elements
from more recent research to update the framework.

Scope of coverage
Button and George (2006) analyze regulations along two
spectrums – “width and depth”. Regulations width is defined
as “the extent to which the different sectors of the private
security industry are regulated” (2006, p. 567). The field of
private security is quite broad and includes a variety of sectors.
A wide regulatory model includes at least two sectors of the
industry, such as security consultants and security equipment
installers (2006). Prenzler and Sarre (2008) reinforce and
expand on the need for wide coverage, advocating for com
prehensive licensing that covers “all occupations involved in
security work” (p. 24).
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Table 1
Width of Regulations

Scope of
Coverage

Narrow

Wide

Manned Security Services,
Private Investigators

Manned Security Services, Private
Investigators, Security Consultants,
Installers of Security Equipment,
and beyond

Source: Adapted from George and Button, 1997, p. 191-192
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Despite not covering every occupation connected to
security work, Mexican regulations tend to have a wide
scope that account for many different private security
sectors. Regulations from the federal government and
Nuevo León cover seven private security sectors, whereas
those from Mexico City cover five (México, 2014; México,
2011; Nuevo León, 2021). By casting a large coverage
net, these regulations ensure that all (or at least most)
forms of private security provision are accounted for,
monitored, and directed by the state. Among the states
under study, Jalisco is the only one with narrower cove
rage, addressing manned security services, goods trans
fer protection, and custody and surveillance of goods
(Jalisco State Government, 2004).
Table 2
Width of Regulations Applied to Mexican Cases

Scope of
Coverage

Federal
Government

Mexico City

Jalisco

Nuevo León

Wide

Wide

Narrow

Wide

Depth of coverage
Depth of regulations are defined as “the number and
type of regulations to be met by private security firms and
employees” (George; Button, 2006, p. 567). Governing bodies
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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may impose “minimal” to “comprehensive” requirements for
firms and individuals seeking to obtain and retain a private
security operator’s license. George and Button (2006) distin
guish between two main types of private security regulations:
(1) those “that seek to address the character of employees,
owners, etc.;” and (2) those “that seek to enhance the quality
of security provision through minimum standards of training
and operation” (p. 568). A comprehensive regulatory system
must cover both regulations types and apply them to private
security firms and employees. Prenzler and Sarre (2008),
Button and Siternstedt (2017), and the UNODC (2014) pro
vide important additions to the model proposed by Button
and George (2006), included below in italics.
Table 3
Depth of Regulations
Comprehensive Regulatory System
Entrance Requirements for Firms to Enter Industry
a) Payment of Fee for License
b) Restrictions on Background of Owner/Qualifying Agent
c) Minimum Experience/Qualifications of Owner/Qualifying Agent
d) Minimum Training for Owner/Qualifying Agent
e) Passing of Examination of Owner/Qualifying Agent
f) Fingerprinting of License Applicants
Entrance Requirements for Individuals to Work in Industry
a) Payment of Fee for License/Registration
b) Restrictions on Background of Employees
c) Minimum Training for Employees
d) First Aid Certification
e) Passing of Examination by Employees
f) Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs
g) Requirement or Refresher/Specialist Training
Minimum Standards of Operation
a) Bonding/Insurance
b) Facilities/Equipment
c) Other Standards
d) Code of Conduct
e) Use of Force Guidelines
f) Police Cooperation
Source: Adapted from George and Button, 1997, p.193; Prenzler and Sarre, 2008;
George and Stiernstedt 2017; UNODC 2014.
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Mexican private security regulations tend to follow
some of the entrance requirements for firms, but not all.
In all cases, paying a license fee is required. Although some
regulations do require minimum experience and restric
tions on the background of the owner or qualifying agent,
these tend to be vague and/or somewhat minimal. Most of
the regulations simply demand that firm owners or quali
fying agents must possess Mexican citizenship and provide
evidence of possessing the human, technical, financial
and material means to provide private security services.
Nuevo León, Mexico City, and Jalisco require firm owners
to undergo fingerprinting (Jalisco State Government,
2014; México, 2011; México, 2014; Nuevo León, 2021).
Moreover, only the federal regulations require owners/
qualifying agents to possess minimal training and none of
the regulations mention the need for owners/qualifying
agents to pass an examination (México, 2011).

Entrance requirements for individuals
Individual entrance requirements are much more
comprehensive than those for firm owners. None of the
regulations mention the need for paying a fee to work
in the private security industry; however, hiring require
ments are included in all of them. All regulations require
background check to confirm that potential hires do not
have a criminal record or are current members of the
armed forces or the police. Moreover, anyone dishonora
bly discharged from the armed services or a public security
force is prohibited from working for a private security
company. Before hiring, Mexico City and Jalisco require
applicants to pass a medical and drug tests (Jalisco State
Government, 2014; México, 2014), and Mexico City’s
regulations also mandate psychological and lie detector
tests. Furthermore, medical, psychological, and drug tests
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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must be administered annually to all personnel (México,
2014). Although not mandatory during the hiring pro
cess, Nuevo León requires all operative personnel to take
medical, psychological, and toxicology exams annually
once they have been employed by a firm (Nuevo León,
2021). None of the regulations mandate first aid certifi
cation or alcohol tests.
All the regulations require some form of personnel
training, either laying out a specific training regimen
that all companies must enact or requiring employees
to receive training at the state police academy. The trai
ning guidelines of Mexico City, for example, are quite
rigorous, and employees must undergo evaluation after
completing each training session (México, 2014). Overall,
private security guards are expected to receive approxi
mately 80 hours of training immediately after enrollment
and periodic training throughout their careers, as well
as annual accreditation (Arámbula, 2014; México, 2014).
Although below the European average, 80 training hours
is far above the requirements for several countries in the
region, including Germany, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Italy,
and the United Kingdom (CoESS, 2015). In Nuevo León,
employees must receive training at the University of
Security Sciences or at private training centers approved
by La Dirección de Control y Supervisión a Empresas y Servicios
de Seguridad Privada. In turn, to ensure that all person
nel are subjected to the training regimen desired by the
state, private security employees in Jalisco are instructed
at the State police academy (Ibarra, 2014; Jalisco State
Government, 2014; Nuevo León, 2021).

Minimum standards of operation
In general, the regulations cover most of the criteria
established by George and Button (2006) for minimum
standards of operation. According to Mexico City and
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Jalisco, firms must possess insurance policies that gua
rantee payment to clients for any damages caused during
their services. All the regulations address facilities and
tend to be quite strict in regard to equipment. To ensure
everything has been registered and is working properly,
facilities and equipment undergo annual inspections.
The regulations also specify that uniform colors, logos,
and emblems must be different from those used by the
police and armed forces and vehicles, cannot be similar
to those used by public security forces nor be equipped
with sirens.
Some regulations are much more specific and detailed.
In Mexico City, for example, vehicles must display their
denomination, logo, ID number, permit and autho
rization number, and the words seguridad privada.
The letters and numbers must be at least fifteen centi
meters high and seven centimeters wide (México, 2014).
Metal badges are prohibited. Stripes on shirtsleeves and
along the sides of pants must contrast in color (México,
2014). In Jalisco, private security personnel must wear a
white shirt with the company logo located on their left
sleeve five centimeters below the seam on the left shoul
der of the uniform. “Seguridad Privada” must be written
along the left chest area of the uniform. Pants must be
black with a five-centimeter white stripe on each side.
Similarly, hats and footwear must be black, the former
including “Servicio de Seguridad Privada” written across
their front. Coats must be gray. The words policía, agentes,
and investigadores are prohibited from being written any
where on the uniform. Vehicles must be white and state
“seguridad privada” below the company logo on the side of
each back door (Jalisco State Government, 2014).

Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Except for Mexico City, all regulations describe the
proper conduct to be followed by private security emplo
yees when interacting with citizens. Both the federal gover
nment and the Jaliscan government emphasize human
rights standards in their regulations. Federal regulations
state that personnel must respect human rights as deli
neated in the Mexican Constitution and international
treaties, by treating people correctly, impartially, and with
dignity and integrity and abstaining from all arbitrary and
unjustified violence, including abuse and torture. In turn,
Jalisco’s regulations state that private security employees
must respect human rights in the same manner as the
rules accorded to the state public security forces (Jalisco
State Government, 2014). In Nuevo León, private security
personnel are expected to show professionalism, honesty,
and respect for other people’s rights, as well as to avoid
abuse and arbitrary violence and follow the principles of
conduct expected of public security employees as establi
shed in the Public Security Law of Nuevo León (Nuevo
León, 2021). Despite mentioning the avoidance of abusive
behavior and arbitrary violence, none of the regulations
include detailed guidelines regarding the use of force.
All the regulations provide guidelines regarding coo
peration between private security firms and police depart
ments. The federal government, Mexico City, Jalisco,
and Nuevo Leon stipulate that private security serves an auxi
liary and complementary service to public security, requiring
it to share data with the police and assist on criminal investiga
tions (México, 2011; México, 2014; Jalisco, 2014; Nuevo León,
2021). Nuevo León and Jalisco mandate private security to
assist the police “when it is required”, so that coordination
is even more generalized (Jalisco State Government, 2014;
Nuevo León, 2017).
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43

A failure to impose control

Table 4
Entrance Requirements for Firms to Enter Industry Applied to Mexican Cases
Entrance Requirements for Firms to Enter Industry
Federal
Government

Mexico
City

Jalisco

Nuevo León

Payment of Fee for License

X

X

X

X

Restrictions on Background
of Owner/Qualifying Agent

Partial

Partial

Partial

Partial

Minimum experience/
Qualifications of Owner/
Qualifying Agent

Partial

Partial

Partial

Partial

Minimum Training for
Owner/Qualifying Agent

X

X

X

X

Passing of Examination of
Owner/Qualifying Agent
Fingerprinting of Licensing
Agent

X

Examination Requirements for Individuals to Work in Industry

44

Payment of Fee for
License/Registration
Restrictions on Background
of Employees

X

X

X

X

Minimum Training for
Employees

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Partial

Partial

Partial

Partial

First Aid Certification
Passing of Examination
by Employees
Drug and Alcohol Testing
Requirement or Refresher/
Specialist Training

Minimum Standards of Operation
Bonding/Insurance

X

X

Facilities/Equipment

X

X

X

X

Other Standards

X

X

X

X

Code of Conduct

X

Partial

X

Use of Force Guidelines
Police Cooperation

Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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Summary of Findings and Brief Comparisons with
Other Cases
Despite some variation, the regulations formula
ted by the Federal government of Mexico, Mexico City,
Nuevo León, and Jalisco tend to be quite stringent and
robust, entailing fees for private security licenses, copious
amounts of documentation for registration, and strict uni
form, vehicle, and equipment requirements. Apart from
Jalisco, all the regulations address a wide number of pri
vate security sectors. Although documents lack precise
requirements for firms to enter the industry and vary as
to hiring requirements, all the regulations include stan
dards for new hires and for the administration of seve
ral tests either before hiring or to continue employment.
Training standards also vary, but they all provide detailed
requirements or force companies to send their employees
to police academies. All the cases also stipulate coordina
tion with law enforcement, and only Mexico City lacks a
code of conduct.
In comparison, these regulations tend to be wider
and more comprehensive than most U.S. states and a
number of foreign countries (Button, 2007; Button, 2012;
Button and George, 2006; McCrie, 2017; Waard, 1999).
In a study conducted by McCrie (2017), the author
demonstrates the massive deficiencies and gaps in state
private security regulations in the United States of
America, verifying, for example, that twelve states lack
any regulations for unarmed guards, while thirteen have
none for armed guards. Moreover, just over half of states
require background checks as part of the hiring process,
and multiple states require no basic training or firearms
training for guards. In Slovakia, private security compa
nies do not need a license to operate and uniforms for
guards are optional. In Austria and the Czech Republic,
the industry falls within the country’s general commercial
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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law, thus there are no specific private security regulations
(CoESS, 2013).
Nevertheless, the consequence of imposing tight regu
lations has had the opposite effect that regulators intended:
instead of promoting increased state control over the
private security industry, private security providers have
distanced themselves from the state by avoiding registra
tion and regulatory measures. As the Director General of
the federal private security office of Mexico explained,
“it’s easier not to comply than to comply” with private
security laws (Arámbula, 2014). Moreover, weak enfor
cement has allowed security providers to avoid the law
while corrupt government officials use their power as gate
keepers to make access to private security and weapons
licenses easy for some and extremely difficult for others.
Consequently, informality in the industry is widespread as
will be described in the following section.
46

Widespread informality
Private security firms operating on the margins of
the law by failing to register or only partially registe
ring are colloquially known as patitos. Patitos tend to be
small, local firms that appear for a few months with one
name, disappear, and then re-emerge with a new name.
The highly variable quality of private security firms served
as a major impetus to develop private security laws. After the
establishment of these laws, patitos quickly emerged,
spurring reforms to create more stringent regulations to
eliminate these unregulated and underregulated firms.
Nevertheless, I argue that the imposition of even stricter
and more costly regulations, combined with weak enfor
cement and corruption, have further fueled the spread
of patitos throughout Mexico. Private security represen
tatives, government officials, journalists, academics,
and members of civil society all tend to agree that
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021
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widespread informality in the private security sector
is one of the most serious – if not the most serious –
problem affecting the industry.
The number of unregistered private security firms in
Mexico fluctuates widely due to a lack of solid documen
tation, with some reports placing the number at forty to
sixty percent, while other estimates go as high as eighty or
ninety percent (Domínguez, 2013; Frutos, 2014; Universal,
2014). A study conducted in 2013 by the Consejo Nacional
de Seguridad Privada found that only 659 out of the 8,500
private security companies in Mexico were registered with
the government (Milenio, 2013). Around 60% of firms in
Jalisco are estimated to be unregulated, while 25–30% of
the companies in Nuevo León are unauthorized (Abundan
empresas…, 2015; Ibarra, 2014; Osorio, 2016).2 Despite the
lack of data on the specific percentage of unregistered com
panies in Mexico City, complaints of widespread informality
are common in the capital.

High costs of obeying regulations
Besides registering in each state where they are active,
private security firms operating in more than one state
must also register with the federal government. Moreover,
some municipal governments also mandate that companies
register with them. Paying registration fees with the state,
municipal, and federal governments can be exceedingly
costly for companies, thus serving as a major deterrent to
registration. The following table shows the costs involved
with registering and maintaining a private security com
pany in each jurisdiction.

One estimate places the unregistered rate in Nuevo León as high as eighty percent
(La Seguridad…, 2010).
2
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Table 5
Private Security Licensing Fees (Mexican pesos)
Federal
Private security
permit (fee varies
depending
on service)
Authorization for
individuals and
companies to
perform private
security activities

$18,353 –
$13,723 –
$19,808(~$885 $18054 (~$662
- $956 USD)
- $871 USD)

$5,943
(~$287 USD)

Issuance of
documents and
information
from the private
security registry

48

Mexico City

$5,149
(~$248 USD)

Jalisco

Nuevo Leon

$18,500
(flat rate)
(~$1,032
USD)

$15,448 –
$16,328
(~ $865 $915 USD)
$6,030
($340 USD)
$4,962 per
year for
revalidation
($280 USD)

$329
(~$16 USD)

Documents
certification

$22
(~$1 USD)

$13.50 (per
page) (~$00.65
USD)

Personnel
registration

$199
(~$10 USD)

$215 (per
person) (~$10
USD)

$160
($9 USD)

$132 per canine
(~$6 USD)

$80 per
canine
(~$4 USD)

Canine
registration
Vehicle and radio
communication
registration

$60
(~$3 USD)

$332 per item
(~$16 USD)

$80 per
vehicle
(~$4 USD)

Equipment
registration

$60
(~$3 USD)

$12 per item
(~$00.58 USD)

$80 per
bulletproof
vest
(~$4 USD)

Firearms
registration

$60
(~$3 USD)

$332 per
firearm
(~$16 USD)

$80 per
firearm
(~$4 USD)

Sources: Dirección General de Seguridad Privada y Colaboración Interinstitucional
de la Secretaría de Seguridad Ciudadana de la Ciudad de México; Direccíon de
Seguridad Privada de la Comisión Nacional de Seguridad; State Employee, 2014;
Ibarra, 2014.
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Private security providers openly complain about the
high costs associated with registering and maintaining a com
pany and the copious amounts of paperwork involved in the
process. Due to these elevated costs, many companies regis
ter after they have existed for a few years and earned enough
income to afford to pay registration fees and compete with
other registered companies (Security Company Manager,
2014). Moreover, most companies that do register tend to only
do so with individual states and not with the federal govern
ment, either because they only operate in one state or because
they want to avoid the registration fees, additional paper
work, and regulations linked to the federal law. Consequently,
only 20% of registered companies are regulated by the fede
ral government (Desfassiaux, 2011, p. 88). As one security
consultant explained, “it’s an expensive proposition for them
[private security firms] and if they can get away without it then
they do it” (Security Consultant [1], 2013).
Hiring and maintaining personnel can also be very costly
and time consuming for private security companies. According
to the Director General of the federal government private
security office, a company with 1,000 employees must submit
thousands upon thousands of training reports to the govern
ment (Arámbula, 2014). Moreover, requesting background
checks and administering each test – medical, psychological,
toxicological – can be quite expensive for the companies,
adding up to about $5,000 to $10,000 pesos per employee or
applicant (Retired Government Functionary, 2014).
Employee turnover rates are extremely high in the
field of private security, and firms often provide short
-term contracts that may last only a few weeks or months.
Consequently, companies are even more reluctant to spend
hiring and training costs on them (Perret 2013, p. 168).
Some companies will attempt to reduce costs by withholding
information during the registration process or by registering
only part of their personnel. A company with one hundred
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employees, for example, may only report fifty of them, thus
paying the hiring and registration fees of half of their per
sonnel and avoiding major costs. Avoiding detection of
this discrepancy is not difficult because verifiers are mostly
interested in looking at paperwork and documentation ins
tead of observing actual operations (Retired Government
Functionary, 2014).
Proper training also incurs an elevated cost, so that
many companies, especially small ones, often bypass or cur
tail this process. In many cases, guards receive a basic oneto two-hour lesson and are sent into the field (Bagur, 2014;
Security Consultant [2], 2014). To avoid training expenses,
unregulated private security companies often hire former
military and police officers dishonorably discharged for
corruption or incompetence, since they already have prior
experience in the field (Security Company Manager, 2014;
Alvarado, 2012).
Acquiring a firearms license is costly and difficult,
which dissuades companies from legally obtaining them.
All firearms licenses are granted by SEDENA and all firearms
purchases must be made through the institution. The appli
cation process for a license involves significant amounts of
paperwork, time, and money (Security Company Owner
[2], 2014). The license cost for private security companies
is $$40,503.00pesos (~$1,957 USD) – more than double the
cost of a license to operate a private security firm in most
states – and, once granted, the company must revalidate
the license annually for the same cost as the initial registra
tion fee listed (SEDENA, 2021). These companies are also
required to rent or construct a shooting range and provide
weapons training certification to all of their employees,
both costly endeavors (Security Company Manager, 2013).
Beyond legal requirements, private security providers
have highlighted the importance of political connections for
obtaining a firearms license, thus providing evidence of the
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tollbooth model in action. (Security Consultant [2], 2014).
As stated by a private security representative, although mem
bers of militias, former police officers, military officers,
commanders, and politicians acquire firearm licenses with
ease, such a doing is extremely difficult for everybody else
(Security Manager [4], 2014). By establishing these barriers
to access, government officials can use their power to benefit
those with whom they have personal and prior professional
relationships while ignoring the rest. The thriving under
ground economy around weapons licenses is yet another fac
tor for obtaining a license, whereby individuals connected
to those within SEDENA acquire and illegally sell licenses
off for a profit. According to one of these sellers, “winning
the lottery is easier than obtaining a license” (Gutierrez,
2013, translated from Spanish. As a result, the high barriers
to acquiring a weapons license seemingly indicates that the
state is effectively controlling the security industry in this
realm, however, the process for obtaining a license is arbi
trary and does not follow the stated intentions of the regu
lations put into place. Moreover, the creation of high and
arbitrary barriers also serves to incentivize private security
providers to avoid the process altogether by purchasing wea
pons licenses or firearms themselves on the black market.

Corruption
Upper and lower-level government corruption plagues
state – private security relations. By creating strict and costly
regulations, politicians, government officials, and bureau
crats working in private security law enforcement agen
cies have enhanced opportunities to use their authority as
gatekeepers to provide preferential treatment and unequal
benefits to associates while extracting bribes and complica
ting the registration process for others. These cases evince
the capture theory “tollbooth” variant. As Davis (2003)
explains, “formal laws do little to regulate private police in a
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country where regulators – i.e. the public police – themselves
are corrupt. If the keepers are themselves transgressors,
what value is the law, even with a formal democracy
on the books?” Corruption in registration, inspection,
and enforcement has further limited the power and effecti
veness of private security regulations to allow the state to con
trol and direct the industry in a manner beneficial to state
capacity as it creates inequality in the registration process,
further discourages companies from abiding by regulations,
and creates resentment from firm owners.
At the upper levels of the federal and state governments,
there is something of a revolving door between public security
departments and the private security industry. Those who
retire from the armed forces and public security will most
likely enter private security. A retired captain who later fou
nded his own security company described a common joke
between retired military officers that goes: “Now that you’ve
retired, what company are you going to run?” (Retired Private
Security Owner, 2014). Private security enforcement agencies
are also populated with former members of the police and the
military, thus facilitating collusive relationships. For example,
Raúl Rojas Mendoza was appointed Director of the Dirección
de Seguridad Privada y Procedimientos Sistemáticos of Mexico
City only after serving a long career in the Mexican Armed
Forces (Rojas Mendoza, 2014). Former officials from the
State Department, intelligence, military, and public security
use their government connections to establish security com
panies more easily, obtain weapons licenses, avoid or receive
rubber-stamped private security registration, and acquire
public and private contracts.
For example, Eider Martín Silva Arboleda established
a private security company while working at the Secretaría de
Seguridad Pública de Jalisco under the supervision of Attorney
General Luis Carlo Nájera. After Arboleda left the public
sector, Nájera granted his company a contract worth close
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to $15 million pesos (~$863,000 USD) to provide speciali
zed training to the preventive police of Jalisco (Plascencia,
2014). Similarly, soon after leaving his post as Secretario de
Seguridad Pública (Mexico’s top police chief), Genaro García
Luna established himself within a private security company
whose owner he had connections with while in public office,
bringing a group of people with whom he had worked with
in the secretariat along him – including former members of
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations, Drug Enforcement
Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Colombian
National Police force (Ramírez, 2014). Additionally, private
security company owners accused Francisco Cienfuegos,
a Nuevo León deputy and spokesmen for Governor Rodrigo
Medina de la Cruz, of using his authority to delay other com
panies from receiving their private security licenses so that
he could garner more security contracts for his own com
pany, Protege – a private security company he owned with his
sister (Frutos, 2014).
Private security company owners have also used
their power and connections to gain public office and
manipulate government policy for their own benefit.
In 2010, Servando Sepúlveda – the owner of Centurión
Alta Seguridad Privada, one of the largest private security
providers in Guadalajara – was appointed the Director de
Seguridad Pública of the city. Once in office, Sepúlveda
proposed and advocated for policy changes benefitting
the private security industry, such as requiring all banks
to use the services of private security companies for their
protection needs (La Seguridad…, 2010; Reza, 2010).
These cases provide clear evidence of the means
through which relationships between government officials
and private actors involved with the security sector lead to
acts of collusion. In an attempt to reward themselves, their
former colleagues, or their friends by providing them with
security contracts or weapons and private security licenses,
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public officials are violating the rules and norms of their
office and consequently creating resentment in the industry.
Private security providers have complained that those with
special government connections possess an unfair compe
titive advantage (Frutos, 2014; Security Company Manager
[2], 2014), thus harming their interests because other actors
are receiving benefits to which they are not legitimately enti
tled (Philp 2008, p. 310). As a result, further distrust of the
government is sowed within the private security industry and
incentives to engage in the registration process are reduced.
Additionally, executives from smaller firms that lack gover
nment connections complain that they have been barred
access to security licenses, which left them with no choice
but to operate as patitos (Frutos, 2014).
Strict and costly regulations, unequal treatment
towards private security providers, and lax enforcement
encourages informality in an environment where it is
already the norm. Despite the difficulty in identifying the
percentage of unregulated firms due to the hidden nature
of informality, 60% of Mexican workers are estimated to
operate in the informal economy (Hughes, 2013). In the
private security industry, these estimates reach as high
as 80–90%, surpassing the national average of general
participation in the informal economy (Universal 2014).
Bribery is yet another major problem in Mexico, being
commonly expected and widely accepted in the registra
tion process. According to Bailey (2014), a high prevalence
of informality promotes a culture of illegality and reinfor
ces “expectations for extra-legal exchanges throughout
society” (p. 32). Transparency International’s 2017 Global
Corruption Monitor report found 51% of Mexicans admit
ted to paying bribes. This percentage is the highest in all
of Latin America. Bribery is, therefore, commonly expected
and accepted in the registration process. Verifiers regularly
demand bribes from company owners during inspection
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visits, which smaller firms may try to avoid by entering the
informal market instead. Security firm owners will also
take the initiative by offering bribes to verifiers in order to
receive rubber stamped registration or inspection certifica
tion (Muller 2010, p. 141; Arámbula, 2013). Although pro
blematic in any sector, corruption and evasion are particu
larly dangerous in the security sector, considering the ability
of private security providers to wield violence and the state’s
primary responsibility to provide security to its citizenry and
maintain law and order.

Weak enforcement
Corruption and the high costs associated with strict
regulations help discourage security providers from regis
tering and abiding by the law – issues further aggravated by
the state’s inability to effectively enforce it. As Perret (2013)
explains, “Although Mexican laws such as the Federal Law
on Private Security contemplate and seek to address seve
ral of the challenges posed by the privatization of security
in Mexico, such regulations are only adequate on paper.
In real life, implementation of the laws falls short, resul
ting in deficient regulation of private security” (p. 169).
The government’s inability to identify, sanction, and com
pel this large swath of unregulated firms to register and
obey the law isevidence of the state’s failure to enforce its
private security regulations.
Weak enforcement is linked to a lack of political will and
pressure to designate more energy and resources to streng
thening government oversight of private security companies
(Muller, 2010, p. 142). Mexico City, Jalisco, and Nuevo León
all face shortages in personnel that make authorizing and
inspecting all the companies in their domains quite difficult,
if not impossible. In many cases, site visits to company
headquarters are rare (Security Company Manager 2014).
Therefore, regulated companies often lack supervision and
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can easily subvert the law. In Mexico City, the Dirección de
Seguridad Privada has only four official verifiers authorized
to validate the registration of private security companies
and oversee their operations to ensure they are complying
with regulations (Rojas Mendoza, 2014). Considering the
hundreds of private security companies operating and
attempting to register in the capital, having so few veri
fiers makes the oversight process very difficult. The Director
General de Seguridad Privada y Procedimientos Sistemáticos de
Operación del Distrito Federal, Raúl Rojas Mendoza, argues that
the office needs more verifiers to successfully perform the
tasks demanded of the Dirección de Seguridad Privada (2014).
Oversight that does occur of registered companies is,
therefore, quite minimal. It generally amounts to the Dirección
de Seguridad Privada making sure a company’s registration
papers are all accounted for and then checking in once a
year to demand its annual fees. Even Rojas Mendoza admitted
that, despite their efforts, his office is unable to inspect every
company operating in the city each year (2014).
In Jalisco, the Consejo Estatal de Seguridad Pública sets a
goal to inspect twenty-five percent of registered companies
per year (State Employee 2014). According to a staffer at
the Consejo’s Area de Seguridad Privada, his low bar was esta
blished due to a lack of manpower to inspect every com
pany in the state. Despite their goal, a recent report by
the Robert Strauss Center (2018) found that the Consejo
only inspects an average of three percent of the compa
nies operating in the state each year (p. 5). Only four
employees work in the Area de Seguridad Privada and three
of them are qualified to do inspections. The staffer noted
that it is quite difficult to create new openings in the area
and therefore doubts any new verifiers will be hired soon
(State Employee, 2014). Inspecting a maximum of 25% of
companies per year is clearly unacceptable and, therefore ,
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exhibits the Consejo’s clear inability to properly enforce the
state’s private security regulations.
An administrator at the Dirección de Control y Supervisión
a Empresas y Servicios de Seguridad Privada in Nuevo León des
cribed how the office only has two verifiers along with a legal
representative who is also sent out to do inspections since
they are so understaffed. She explained that the office needs
at least five verifiers to effectively perform all inspections in
the state (Ibarra, 2014).
Public office holders have received minimal public
pressure to reign in the private security industry, thus limi
ting their incentives to expend more resources on private
regulations enforcement. Despite the major efforts taken
by civil society to critique, protest, and improve public
security forces in Mexico, little public attention has been
directed at the private security industry. Major Mexican
news publications often publish a few stories each year
lamenting the high levels of informality in the indus
try, but they do not seem to have much effect amongst
the public. Although large demonstrations have taken
place throughout the country over the past three decades
to protest increases in crime and the failures of Mexico’s
police forces and criminal justice system, none have addres
sed improvingthe private security industry. Civil society
organizations, such as Mexicanos Contra la Delincuencia
and Causa en Común and think tanks, such as El Instituto
para la Seguridad y Democracia and El Instituto Ciudadano
de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad, have formed out of these
protests with the primary goal of understanding how to
improve the criminal justice system in Mexico and reduce
incidences of crime and violence. Yet none of these groups
pay much (if any) attention to private security. Such a lack
of pressure translates into a lack of incentive for office
holders to take additional actions regarding the industry.
AsMuller (2010) points out, “due to the lack of both public
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 114: 29-68, 2021

57

A failure to impose control

58

and academic debates on private security, the topic of pri
vate security does not rank high on the security agenda of
local politicians, as engaging in issues of private policing
offers little political gains” (p. 142).
Beyond the lack of public pressure, politicians may
resist the enforcement of strict regulations due to poli
tical calculations. The private security sector is a major
employer in Mexico with low entry barriers. Jobs in the
security field, such as guard services, require little to
no experience nor education, thereforeprivate security
company headquarters are often located in lower-in
come neighborhoods for recruitment purposes (Security
Company Owner [1], 2014). Consequently, it is in the
interest of politicians to ensure their constituents con
tinue to have access to these employment opportunities.
Muller (2016) describes the predicament of a local poli
tician in Mexico City who, despite believing in stringent
private security regulations, opposes its enforcement
because many of her poorer constituents rely on the
private security sector as a source of employment. Thus,
the stricter enforcement of private security regulations
would disqualify a number of her constituents from wor
king in the sector, which could lead to negative electoral
repercussions (p. 135).
As a result of weak enforcement, firms can benefit
financially by avoiding regulations and undercutting
the market in an environment where informal exchan
ges are more readily acceptable. Unregistered com
panies can charge much lower prices for their services
because they do not pay taxes and registration fees and
avoid laws regulating training requirements, uniforms,
hiring standards, and wages. Thus, these companies often
pay lower wages than those established by the law and
provide their employees with shoddy uniforms and equi
pment. As a result, registered private security companies
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charge clients an average of $13,000 to $14,000 pesos
(~$700 - $740 USD) per month, whereas unregiste
red companies may charge as little as $6,000 pesos
(~$325 USD) (Pallares Gómez, 2014).

Conclusion
Despite the traditional view that comprehensive regu
lations improve government control over private security
actors, the Mexican case displays the opposite effect:
strict and expensive regulations have helped reduce the state
ability to effectively control and monitor the private industry
and dissuaded private security owners from participating in
the formal market. Government bureaucrats and officials
have used the rigidity of private security laws to their advan
tage, adopting the “tollbooth approach” to provide their
associates and those willing to pay bribes with easier access
to private security permits while barring access to others.
Weak enforcement of the law has enabled the avoidance of
the government’s reach, which has to do with a lack of strong
political incentives to devote additional resources to private
security enforcement agencies. In sum, high entry bar
riers, weak enforcement, and rampant corruption, have led
most firms to avoid or only partially register, or engage
in corrupt activities to gain access to the security market,
leading to widespread informality that has severely limited
government control over the industry.
The Mexican government should take a number of steps
to improve this situation. Unlike some public choice theorists,
I am not arguing to eliminate most or all regulations in favor
of letting the free market take over. In many ways, much of
the Mexican private security market is already guided by the
free market – since a large percentage of firms operate out
side of the government’s reach. As evidenced, firms operating
in this environment often contribute to the problem of inse
curity through their tendency to hire unqualified individuals,
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potential criminals, and dishonorably discharged members of
the police and military, provide little to no training to emplo
yees, and low wages. Prenzler and Sarre (2008) describe the
deficiencies of relying on criminal law, civil law, market forces,
or self-regulation for controlling the industry (p. 269-270).
Moreover, Zedner (2006) highlights that private security regu
lations serve a number of important functions.Most notably,
security is of a higher and more sensitive order than most com
modities and, therefore, “the level of risk to which the public
are exposed by ill-qualified staff, inadequate training or inade
quate (or no) insurance cover is deemed so grave as to justify,
even demand, state intervention” (p. 276).
Therefore, instead of eliminating regulatory frame
works in Mexico, private security regulations should be sim
plified and standardized across the country. Private security
companies should be subject to one standard national law
as opposed to a different one in each state where they ope
rate. Subjecting all private security providers to one natio
nal private security law would reduce confusion amongst
providers, standardize registration costs, and create a con
sistent standard for firms to follow throughout the country.
Limiting requirements to acquiring state-specific permits
and additional fees would also reduce the number of access
points for “tollbooth activity” that promotes corrupt activity.
Mexican private security companies have lobbied the fede
ral government to pass a standardized national security law,
however, the bill has languished in the Mexican legislature
for years .Unfortunately, the hurdles to passing this law are
immense as a standardized national law would eliminate
individual states’ access to registration fees and reduce their
power over local private security providers.
Second, the enforcement of regulations must be signifi
cantly strengthened by hiring, training, and certifying more
verifiers to expand government coverage and ensure that
all firms are properly following the law specifications. Third,
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the government must identify and reach out to firms avoiding
regulations to explain the regulatory process and demand that
they register with the government. Firms that continue avoi
ding registration should be shutdown with fines assessed to the
owners. Combining a simplified, standardized law that covers
all firms with a larger and enhanced regulatory enforcement
apparatus would go a long way toward improving Mexico’s
private security crisis. Unfortunately, deeply entrenched cor
ruption at the municipal, state, and federal levels and a lack
of strong public pressure and political incentives to alter the
status quo, make the implementation of the suggested policy
improvements unlikely.
This study shows the connections between strong
private security regulations and weak compliance in
certain instances. Without strong state institutions able
to properly enforce the law, tamp down on corruption,
and discourage informality, strict and comprehensive
private security regulations can backfire and reduce
state control over the industry, thus reinforcing its
own weakness.Therefore, simply assessing the strengths
and weaknesses of a state’s regulatory regime is obviously
not sufficient to understanding its effectiveness. Likewise,
describing low compliance and weak enforcement without
highlighting potential links between these outcomes and
regulations rigidity is also unsatisfactory. With this study,
I hope to stimulate more research in the Global South
where these instances are more common that bridges
this gap and questions commonly held misperceptions
about private security regulations and the causes for
their ineffectiveness.
Logan Puck
Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Bates College.
Lewiston, Maine, EUA.
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A FAILURE TO IMPOSE CONTROL: PRIVATE SECURITY AND THE
MEXICAN STATE
LOGAN PUCK
Scholars tend to agree that imposing comprehen
sive regulations is one of the most effective strategies states
can use to control and direct private security companies.
This study shows how attempts to strictly regulate pri
vate security firms have failed in Mexico. The Federal
government of Mexico, as well as each state government,
has created some form of regulation to control the acti
vities of the private security industry. In certain states,
these regulations are more stringent than those in many
countries. Nonetheless, corruption, weak enforcement,
and high entry barriers have created low incentives for
private security firms to abide by government regula
tions, leading to a widespread evasion and an expansive
market of unregulated and undisciplined private security
companies, thus bringing into question the efficacy of
imposing strict private security regulations in states with
weak institutions.
Abstract:

Key Words:
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A FALHA EM IMPOR CONTROLE: SEGURANÇA PRIVADA E O
ESTADO MEXICANO
Os estudiosos tendem a concordar que a imposição de
regulações abrangentes é uma das estratégias mais efetivas que os
estados podem usar para controlar e dirigir empresas de segurança
privada. No entanto, este estudo mostra como as tentativas de
regular estritamente as empresas de segurança privada no México
têm falhado. O governo federal mexicano e todos os estados do país
criaram alguma forma de regulação para controlar as atividades da
indústria da segurança privada. Em alguns estados, essas regulações
Resumo:
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são mais rígidas do que em muitos países do mundo. No entanto,
a corrupção, a fraca imposição de regras e as altas barreiras à
entrada de novas organizações têm criado poucos incentivos para que
as empresas de segurança cumpram as regulações governamentais.
Consequentemente, a evasão generalizada das regulações existentes
tem criado um mercado amplo de empresas de segurança privada
não reguladas e indisciplinadas, questionando, assim, a eficácia de
se impor regulação estrita em Estados com instituições fracas.
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